Mitigating Housing Instability During the COVID-19 Pandemic by Layser, Michelle D. et al.
1Contact: Robin Fretwell Wilson, Director, IGPA: (217) 244-1227
Blaine G. Saito, Assistant Professor of Law, 
Northeastern University School of Law
Task Force on the Impact of the 
COVID-19 Pandemic
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Governments and public health authorities face a seemingly intractable paradox during the COVID-19 pandemic. Key tools used to 
manage public health dimensions of the crisis, 
stay-at-home orders and business shutdowns, 
have initiated a secondary crisis characterized 
by widespread evictions and housing instabil-
ity. Housing instability threatens to undermine 
the public health response to the pandemic by 
increasing the number of households facing acute 
housing distress and various forms of homeless-
ness, ultimately increasing the risk of transmission 
and exposure to COVID-19.1 The pandemic exacer-
bates longstanding housing issues—homelessness, 
affordable housing shortages, and more broadly, 
the relationship between income insecurity and 
housing instability.2 
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This Policy Spotlight explains how housing insta-
bility may affect public health in the near term 
and deepen social and economic inequities in 
the years following the pandemic. It analyzes the 
strengths and limitations of gov-
ernment efforts to mitigate hous-
ing instability during the pandemic, 
drawing on the 2008 housing crisis 
and Great Recession as points of 
reference. Finally, it sets forth sug-
gestions for what can be done to 
mitigate aspects of the unfolding 
housing crisis in the coming months. 
In addition to extending and enforc-
ing eviction freezes, direct housing 
payment assistance for renters and 
homeowners is necessary to prevent 
a wave of evictions and foreclosures. 
Place-based investment in affordable housing and 
distressed neighborhoods will also be necessary 
for the years following the pandemic.
A PUBLIC HEALTH PARADOX
Physical distancing, a crucial public health tool 
for controlling the spread of COVID-19, results in 
economic and social responses that can directly 
and indirectly increase housing instability. The 
initial round of stay-at-home orders went into 
effect in March 2020.3 Only one-third of tenants 
indicated they could pay rent in April, and only 
slightly more than half expected to be able to 
pay full rent in the following months. Homeown-
ers also fell behind. Roughly 3.4% of Americans 
were delinquent on their mortgage payments as 
of April 2020, and by July 2020, 4.1 million home-
owners were in forbearance. Data from the weekl
U.S. Census Bureau’s Household PULSE Survey 
show that, between August and November 2020, 
15% to 18% of renters were behind on rent each 
week. In Louisiana, New Jersey, South Carolina, 
Alabama, Mississippi, and the District of Columbia
more than one-fourth of renters reported being 
behind.4 In Illinois, approximately 250,000 house-
holds faced eviction in Cook County alone as of 
February 2021.
Temporary eviction freezes and foreclosure 
moratoriums implemented by federal and state 
governments—combined with cash assistance 
included in the federal Coronavirus Aid, Relief, 
and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) and 
the Onmibus Appropriations Bill passed in Jan-
uary 2021—have delayed widespread evictions 
and foreclosures. However, a wave of evictions 
is anticipated when current moratoriums expire 
unless substantial income supports are instituted 
for renters and owners. Housing attorneys have 
y 
, 
already reported “a flood” of wrongful eviction 
cases nationwide because of COVID-19, and the 
backlog of eviction filings continues to grow 
despite existing moratoriums.5 An eviction pro-
ceeding can be filed, but the matter 
cannot be heard or enforced due to 
the eviction freezes that are in place. 
These pending eviction filings stand 
to become immediately enforceable 
by courts once the freezes are lifted.
This housing instability constitutes 
a health threat both to individuals 
experiencing it and to the broader 
public. Residential foreclosure is 
associated with worsened mental 
health and adverse health behaviors, 
which are in turn linked to poorer 
health status.6 Residential eviction is associated 
with increased levels of stress, depression, anxiety, 
and insomnia, as well as other negative effects on 
tenant mental and physical health.7 
The health consequences experienced by individ-
uals also impose costs on the broader public. For 
example, they “often trigger a social safety net 
response (e.g., use of homeless shelters, Medicaid 
spending …, payment of unemployment benefits) 
that is extremely expensive for states and cities.”8 
A review of 25 unique studies on foreclosure 
found that home foreclosure adversely affects 
physical and mental health at the community level 
as well as the individual level.9
The spillover effects will be even more dire in the 
context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Households 
facing eviction are more likely to move into crowd-
ed spaces like shared residences, where the risk of 
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residences have an increased number of daily 
contacts and are less able to self-quarantine or 
isolate if they experience symptoms. This allows 
the virus to spread between occupants of the res-
idence, causing even more infections and deaths. 
Put plainly, housing instability exacerbates both 
COVID-19 infection rates and resulting deaths.10 
DISPARATE IMPACTS ON PEOPLE OF COLOR
Housing instability is experienced disparately 
based on race and ethnicity, and these disparities 
are also reflected in which households are facing 
eviction once federal, state, and local moratoriums
are lifted. Eviction rates were high even before the
pandemic and disproportionately affected com-
munities of color. One study of evictions noted 
significant racial disparities in the neighborhoods 
most impacted by evictions. Researchers in Bos-
ton found found that, between 2014 and 2016, a 
disproportionate number of evictions happened 
in communities of color, and that the number of 
 
 
Black renters in an area is a better 
predictor of eviction filings than any 
other factor.11
Our analysis of county-level evic-
tion rates in 2016 showed that they 
tend to increase as the nonwhite 
proportion of the population increas-
es.12 The quintile of counties with 
the highest proportion of nonwhite 
residents experienced eviction filings 
at more than four times the rate of 
those in the lowest quintile. Likewise, 
the eviction rate in these counties 
was nearly double. This recent histo-
ry suggests that evictions are likely 
to disproportionately affect racial 
minorities, even before accounting 
for additional economic and health 
disparities driven by the COVID-19 
pandemic.
Between August 19th and November 23rd, 2020, 
weekly surveys conducted by the U.S. Census 
Bureau examined the proportion of renters facing 
the threat of eviction. Of those renters surveyed, 
in each week between 40%–49% of white renters 
faced the likely threat of eviction within the next 
two months. By comparison, 17%–33% of Asian 
renters, 39%–54% of Latino renters, 41%-54%  of 
Black renters, and 43%-62% of renters in other 
racial or ethnic groups faced the threat of eviction 
in each weekly survey.13 
Furthermore, early data on the economic fallout 
from the COVID-19 pandemic suggest that people 
of color have been disproportionately 
affected. While the total number of 
active business owners decreased by 
3.3 million, or 22%, between February 
and April 2020, the impact on com-
munities of color was even more pro-
nounced. Black-owned businesses fell 
by 41%, Latino-owned by 32%, Asian-
owned by 26%, and female-owned by 
25%.14 The “concentrations of female, 
black, Latinx and Asian businesses in 
industries hit hard by the pandemic 
contributed to why losses were high-
er for these groups than the national 
average loss.”15 
The economic impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic has hit women 
particularly hard. Women dispro-
portionately work in low-wage jobs and jobs that 
come with unstable work schedules. The impli-
cations of necessary stay-at-home orders includ-
ed a loss of wages and, in many cases, a loss of 
work altogether for women in precarious work. 
Between February and April 2020, the unem-
ployment rate for females rose by more than 12 
percentage points.16 Overall, by February 2021, 
women lost more than 5.4 million jobs, repre-
senting more than one million additional jobs lost 
when compared to male workers. Furthermore, 
in December 2020, the entire sum of jobs lost 
by women occurred among Black, Latino, and 
Asian women.17 Executive Order 13995 of January 
21, 2021, titled Ensuring an Equitable Pandemic 
Response and Recovery, also points to additional 
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groups facing disparate health and economic im-
pacts from COVID-19 including sexual and gender 
minority groups, people with disabilities, rural 
communities, and tribal communities.18 
The CARES Act created the Paycheck Protec-
tion Program (PPP), which authorized more than 
$670.3 billion in loans to employers, to help prop 
up small businesses during the pandemic.19 Yet, a 
series of implementation problems have prevent-
ed PPP loans from meeting expectations, particu-
larly in the case of very small businesses.20 These 
problems included delayed issuance of guidance 
and were compounded by decisions by banks 
to prioritize loans to existing customers.21  As a 
result, many women- and minority-owned busi-
nesses did not get loans, despite being specifi-
cally listed as intended recipients.22 The failure of 
PPP loans to support many small businesses has 
left many people—particularly people of color—
increasingly vulnerable to unemployment as the 
pandemic continues. 
LESSONS FROM THE GREAT RECESSION 
While the COVID-19 pandemic differs from previ-
ous housing crises in important ways, several les-
sons can be learned from the efforts to mitigate 
housing instability during the last significant hous-
ing crisis, the Great Recession of 2007-2009.23 
Arguably, the the most effective initiative at that 
time was the Homelessness Prevention and Rapid 
Re-Housing program. It provided flexible funding 
for housing payment assistance, utility payments, 
moving cost assistance, and temporary housing 
assistance.24 Despite a relatively modest appro-
priation of $1.5 billion, the program substantially 
reduced emergency shelter utilization among 
the targeted population. Households entering 
the program had a 10% chance of experiencing 
an episode of homelessness within a year after 
their entry. This suggests that a large-scale, fully 
funded homelessness prevention program that 
includes housing payment assistance paid directly 
to individuals or landlords would be effective to 
mitigate housing instability. 
In contrast, indirect efforts to mitigate housing 
instability through voluntary, market-driven ini-
tiatives have frequently failed to reach their full 
potential due to low participation rates, resource 
constraints, and slow government implementa-
tion. Voluntary mortgage modification programs, 
for example, suffered from lower-than-expected 
participation.25 During the first year of the Home 
Affordable Modification Program, only three 
homeowners were approved for debt reduction 
in Arizona, even though almost half of the state’s 
homeowners held underwater mortgages.
Meanwhile, minimal resources were devoted to 
rental assistance, and interventions to promote 
affordable housing focused on supply-side sub-
sidies for affordable housing development.26 
Though affordable housing development was nec-
essary to address the lasting effects of the hous-
ing crisis, construction takes too long to allow this
capacity-building strategy to serve as an emer-
gency response. Ultimately, these initiatives failed 
to provide relief to many eligible homeowners 
and renters who needed direct housing payment 
assistance.27 
In addition, the Great Recession highlighted the 
need for ongoing mitigation of housing instability 
following the initial crisis period. The Great Reces-
sion was characterized by a long-term elevation in
eviction rates during the recovery period. Further-
more, the recovery was spatially uneven, and the 
effects of the crisis are still visible in many low-in-
come neighborhoods. This spatial unevenness 
was an important impetus for the enactment of 
federal Opportunity Zone (OZ) legislation.28 This 
history illustrates the need for a sustained poli-
cy response that extends beyond the immediate 
crisis.
Moreover, some developments following the 
Great Recession may have heightened the risk 
of housing instability during the COVID-19 pan-
demic. After the Great Recession, investments in 
institutionally owned single-family rental housing 
grew rapidly.29 Research shows that eviction rates 
for these rentals are higher than for other rental 
properties.30 These changes made tenants more 
vulnerable during the pandemic than they were 
before the Great Recession. In addition to an 
increase in tenant housing instability, the financial 
pressure placed upon smaller-sized landlords also 
has the potential to result in further consolidation 
of the rental housing stock under institutional 
investors in rental housing.
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The lasting impact of the Great Recession high-
lights the potential for housing crises to introduce 
long-term vulnerabilities that heighten the risk of 
future crises. The outcomes also signal the need 
for a sustained policy response in the years after 
the pandemic to prevent ongoing harm to minori-
ty communities.
CARES ACT MITIGATION EFFORTS
To address housing instability during the pan-
demic, policymakers may choose to provide 
financial assistance in two ways: sending people 
cash (or cash equivalents) or temporarily stop-
ping their recurring necessary expenses such as 
rent or student loans.31 Though federal and state 
governments have embraced both strategies, the 
most direct early interventions to mitigate hous-
ing instability have been foreclosure moratoriums 
and eviction freezes.32 
The initial federal response to the COVID-19 
pandemic, which came in the form of the CARES 
Act, did not include any federal program au-
thorization to provide direct housing payment 
assistance. Instead, the CARES Act provided 
$150 billion in assistance for state, territorial, and 
tribal governments, with a minimum allocation of 
$1.25 billion per state, which could 
be used for state and local housing 
payment assistance programs.33 
However, this funding was not re-
stricted to use for this purpose, and 
the allocation of these funds varied 
by state. 
Many states did use the funding 
to implement housing assistance 
programs, with additional funds 
being drawn from existing state 
and local funding or budget alloca-
tions.34 In an October 2020 analysis, 
the National Low-Income Housing 
Coalition identified a constellation 
of 438 rental assistance programs, 
including 68 state programs and 
370 local programs.35 For example, 
Illinois has implemented emergen-
cy rental and mortgage assistance 
programs, with the latter prioritizing 
disparately affected homeowners.36 
Florida has provided state-level, 
short-term rental assistance while 
also allocating funding to counties 
for local rental and homeowner pay-
ment assistance programs. Colorado 
has provided direct housing payment assistance 
for renters and homeowners.37
The rental assistance created by these and oth-
er state and local programs benefits residents 
of 43 states and Washington, D.C., with at least 
$2.7 billion in rental assistance and $1.2 billion in 
broader housing assistance (including mortgage 
assistance).38 Notably, however, some states, 
such as Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee, have 
not implemented widespread housing assistance 
programs using the CARES Act funding. Even in 
states that have implemented hous-
ing assistance programs, the demand
for assistance has been extremely 
high, often surpassing available 
resources.39
Meanwhile, the CARES Act failed to 
include dedicated housing payment 
assistance for struggling renters 
or homeowners. Instead, the law 
provided for (1) temporary eviction 
freezes and foreclosure moratoriums,
and (2) cash payments that indi-
rectly mitigated housing instability. 
While these interventions have been 
partially successful in preventing 
widespread foreclosures and evic-
tions, the temporary eviction freezes 
and foreclosure moratoriums are 
insufficient to eliminate the need for 
direct housing payment assistance. 
The cash assistance programs have 
failed to fill that gap.
When they apply, foreclosure mor-
atoriums and eviction freezes are 
mandatory direct regulation, which 
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modification incentives used during the Great Re-
cession. Compared to those voluntary programs, 
these efforts have been relatively successful at 
preventing a wave of foreclosures and evictions 
even as unemployment has spiked to unprece-
dented levels.40 The Urban Institute estimates that 
“eviction moratoria covering federally financed 
properties … apply to roughly 12.3 million (28%) 
of the 43.8 million [U.S.] rental units.” State-level 
eviction freezes have supplemented the federal 
law to cover additional tenant populations. At 
least 43 states implemented eviction freezes in 
the first few months of the pandemic, and at least 
31 states have imposed foreclosure moratoriums.41
However, these state-level interventions vary as 
to the populations covered, the duration, and the 
degree of protection.42 In addition to the limited 
coverage of the freezes, these interventions have 
been hindered by at least two factors: uncertainty 
about how past-due payments should be treated 
once the moratoriums and freezes are lifted, and 
an informal (and often illegal) practice of evicting 
tenants without initiating formal eviction proce-
dures through the court system.43 These issues 
highlight the need for direct housing payment 
assistance, which could take the form of housing 
payment vouchers and be paid directly to land-
lords.44 They also highlight a need for stronger 
enforcement of the freezes themselves. 
Instead of direct housing payment assistance, 
the CARES Act included several provisions for 
monetary relief targeting individuals. Unlike direct 
housing payment assistance, which would target 
distressed homeowners or renters for the ex-
press purpose of mitigating housing instability, 
these programs only address housing instability 
indirectly. The most significant cash assistance for 
individuals has taken the form of expanded un-
employment insurance benefits. The CARES Act 
temporarily expanded: (1) the qualification criteria 
for covered workers; (2) the amount of time that 
people are eligible to remain within the unem-
ployment compensation system; (3) the amount 
of benefits that people receive from unemploy-
ment compensation; and (4) the availability of 
short-time unemployment compensation, other-
wise known as work-share programs.45
The scope of unemployment assistance under the 
CARES Act was unprecedented. The $600 week-
ly supplement to states’ existing unemployment 
insurance was sufficient to bring the national 
average replacement rate—the ratio of average 
unemployment benefits to average wages in each 
state—close to 100%.46 For many low-wage work-
ers, the extra $600 per week could yield more 
compensation than if they had remained em-
ployed.47 As a result, the intervention had signifi-
cant potential to mitigate housing instability.
However, because the program was funded by the 
federal government but left to the states to ad-
minister, large regional variations in implementa-
tion rendered the program more effective in some 
places than others. Such variation stems from: (1) 
differences in states’ capacities to administer an 
unemployment insurance program at scale, and 
(2) differences in states’ capacities to provide 
large unemployment insurance safety nets. 
First, the unemployment insurance system in 
many states was overwhelmed by the sheer 
volume of applications for benefits. As a result, 
many self-employed people, such as gig workers, 
were unable to promptly receive unemployment 
benefits.48 Second, states’ fiscal health concerns 
presented additional challenges. While the new 
benefits are fully funded by the federal govern-
ment, traditional regular benefits and extended 
benefits are still partially funded by the states.49 
Declines in state revenue leave some states facing 
a perfect storm—a combination of increased 
needs and decreased revenue, coupled with 
increased reliance on borrowing from the federal 
government to meet present needs.50 This combi-
nation of circumstances is likely to lead to addi-
tional delays and fiscal crises that further worsen 
housing instability.51 
Ultimately, these implementation challenges 
prevented some struggling renters and home-
owners from receiving cash assistance in time to 
stay current on housing payments. Such payment 
delinquencies, which are hard for many people 
to recover from, have left them vulnerable to 
eviction and foreclosure when freezes and mor-
atoriums expire. Moreover, if homeowners and 
renters do face foreclosure and eviction, they 
may face difficulties buying and renting homes in 
the future. For these reasons, the need for direct 
housing payment assistance remains. If lawmakers 
wait until the freezes are lifted to provide assis-
tance, any delay in the implementation may result 
in mass evictions, as more than 250,000 evictions 
have been filed in courts and will be immediately 
enforceable when the freezes are lifted. 
CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT 
MITIGATION EFFORTS
The Consolidated Appropriations Act signed into 
law on December 27, 2020, included more than 
$900 billion in COVID-19-related relief. In addition 
to extending CARES Act unemployment assis-
tance, the bill included several emergency pro-
visions and appropriations that address housing 
instability.52 As explained below, these provisions 
include extended federal eviction freezes and 
foreclosure moratoriums, housing assistance pay-
ments to be distributed by state and local govern-
ments, increasing funding for the federal Housing 
Choice Voucher Program, and increasing funding 
targeted for affordable housing and community 
development. Overall, these initiatives improve 
upon the mitigation efforts included in the CARES 
Act by targeting assistance directly to housing 
programs. However, the amount of funding con-
tinues to fall significantly short of the estimated 
need, and many tenants will remain vulnerable to 
eviction (legal and illegal) in the coming months.
Specifically, the law extended the U.S. Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention eviction moratori-
um through January 31, 2021 (a deadline that the 
Biden Administration later extended to March 31, 
2021), and it allocated $25 billion in state grants 
for emergency rental assistance. Unlike the state 
grants included in the CARES Act, these grants 
target rental assistance to renter households 
experiencing COVID-19 related housing instabil-
ity who are below 80% of area median income.53 
Specifically, 90% of the funds must be used to 
provide financial assistance for rent, rental arrears, 
utilities and home energy costs and arrears, and 
other rental expenses. State and local govern-
ments must prioritize renter households experi-
encing unemployment for more than 90 days and 
whose income is at or below 50% of area median 
income, helping to ensure that tenants with the 
most need are assisted first.54
This $25 billion in rental assistance is helpful, 
but it is insufficient to meet current needs. The 
National Low-Income Housing Coalition estimates 
that nearly $100 billion in direct rental assistance 
is required.55 Moreover, the bill limits emergen-
cy housing assistance to three months of rent, 
which may leave renters at risk of eviction if the 
pandemic continues to disrupt employment. The 
bill also prohibits states from assisting applicants 
with prospective rental payments until they have 
helped reduce the household’s rental arrears.56 
Because many tenants are currently in arrears due 
to the relative lack of housing assistance under 
the CARES Act, this limitation implies that much 
of the new emergency assistance will be used 
to assist with rental obligations that accrued in 
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2020, and it may fail to cover new obligations that 
arise in 2021. 
In addition to emergency rental assistance, the 
bill included a $25.8 billion appropriation for the 
federal tenant-based rental assistance program 
(Housing Choice Vouchers), which expanded the 
program by $1.9 billion above the 2020 enacted 
level. Of that amount, $43.4 million must be used 
to assist individuals and families who are home-
less.57 While these programs are 
essential parts of federal housing pol-
icy, the increase over non-emergency 
levels is relatively small. 
Beyond assistance for individuals, 
the Consolidated Appropriations Act 
also included place-based initiatives 
aimed at supporting investment in af-
fordable housing and neighborhoods 
hardest hit by COVID-19. The Act 
included a $7.8 billion appropriation 
to the federal Public Housing Fund,58 
which was $387 million above the 
2020 enacted level.59 It established 
a new floor for the Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program 
used for rehabilitation of affordable 
housing or paired with other federal 
subsidies.60 The LIHTC expansion is 
intended to promote private invest-
ment in affordable housing.61 Finally, 
the legislation included $3 billion in 
funding to assist community development fi-
nancial institutions that invest in neighborhoods 
disproportionately affected by the pandemic, and 
it extended the New Markets Tax Credit program 
through 2025.62 These programs may help ad-
dress long-term affordable housing needs and 
the uneven geographic impact of the pandemic 
and will help a greater share of those households 
facing the housing affordability and instability 
challenges.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MITIGATING 
HOUSING INSTABILITY DURING THE 
PANDEMIC
As the federal response evolves alongside the 
pandemic, an effective response 
would include policies focused on 
preventing the displacement of 
owners and renters, create viable 
pathways for revenue recovery on 
the part of landlords and mortgage 
providers, and expand and evolve 
a housing safety net that facilitates 
rapid rehousing of people who lose 
their homes to foreclosure or evic-
tion. The authors recommend that 
policymakers prioritize interventions 
that provide relief directly to indi-
viduals facing housing instability. 
The first form of relief—direct hous-
ing payment assistance—is neces-
sary even when indirect assistance 
(like unemployment insurance) or 
non-monetary direct interventions 
(like eviction freezes and foreclo-
sure moratoriums) are available. The 
second form of emergency relief 
is the implementation of effective 
and enforceable eviction freezes and foreclosure 
moratoriums. 
Housing Payment Assistance
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policies that keep owners and renters in their 
homes and programs that facilitate rapid re-
housing of people who lose their homes due to 
foreclosure or eviction. The $25 billion in rental 
assistance passed as part of the 2021 Consoli-
dated Appropriations Act falls short of the $100 
billion of the estimated need.63 Future federal 
policy responses should include continued hous-
ing-specific monetary assistance for renters or 
homeowners. 
We recommend reinstatement of the Homeless-
ness Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing (HPRR) 
program, which successfully ran from 2009-2012. 
The HPRR program was similar to the emergen-
cy rental assistance grants included in the Con-
solidated Appropriations Act,64 but it was more 
comprehensive. For example, the program specifi-
cally provided funding for rehousing programs, as 
well as temporary housing solutions like hotel and 
motel vouchers.65 A fully funded HPRR program 
could provide direct aid to struggling tenants 
and homeowners, including financial assistance 
and housing relocation and stabilization services. 
Struggling homeowners should also be provided 
direct assistance with mortgage payments, prop-
erty taxes, property insurance, utilities, and other 
housing related costs.66  
We also recommend that lawmak-
ers continue to leverage existing 
tools, such as the Section 8 Housing 
Choice Voucher program, to take 
advantage of established federal 
administrative frameworks that can 
help minimize problems and de-
lays during the program rollout.67 
Though the Consolidated Appro-
priations Act included a $1.9 billion 
increase in Housing Choice Voucher 
funding over 2020 enacted levels, 
we recommend further expansion 
of this tenant-based rental assis-
tance program. We believe that such 
targeted interventions to prevent 
homelessness through tenant and 
homeowner assistance will be more 
effective than place-based strate-
gies or indirect assistance programs. 
An expansion of the Housing Choice Voucher 
Program would also benefit from strengthened 
protections for subsidized renters. Landlord dis-
crimination with respect to a tenant’s source of 
income remains a major issue for voucher-assisted
tenants, and while some state, county, and local 
jurisdictions maintain source of income protection 
laws for voucher-assisted households, coverage 
and enforcement are currently uneven. Working 
 
now toward more permanent fixes for this long-
standing problem will benefit all voucher-assisted 
households, and it will further the fair housing 
goals associated with the Housing Choice Vouch-
er Program.
Eviction Freezes and Foreclosure 
Moratoriums
Eviction freezes and foreclosure 
moratoriums will continue to play a 
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ng instability, so it is essential that 
awmakers take steps to ensure 
such laws are both effective and 
adequately enforced.68 A look at the 
27 cities tracked as part of Evic-
tion Lab’s Eviction Tracking System 
shows a total of 162,563 eviction 
filings since March 15, 2020. Because 
ow-income tenants are particularly 
vulnerable to enforcement failures, 
we recommend that states imple-
ment a right to counsel in eviction 
proceedings during these extreme 
circumstances.69 Recall that while 
many states have implemented 
eviction moratoriums to prevent a 
wave of evictions, housing advocates nevertheless 
report a flood of wrongful eviction cases nation-
wide. Housing instability will likely increase if 
unemployment rates continue to rise and fore-
closure moratoriums and eviction freezes expire. 
This will lead to a further surge of eviction cases, 
precipitating additional housing instability and 
homelessness.70 
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Low-income tenants are in the greatest jeopardy 
and can often be helped with modest resources. 
Many tenants in New York City threatened with 
eviction owe less than $600.71 Studies show that 
a homeless individual can cost taxpayers more 
than $35,000 in programs and services including 
increased costs to the public health care system 
and the cost of emergency housing.72 Studies 
also show that right-to-counsel initiatives save 
resources by preventing the use of homeless 
services and programs simply by keeping people 
in their homes.73 A cost-benefit analysis in New 
York City showed that a right-to-counsel program 
would reduce evictions by 77% and save $320 
million each year.74 Keeping people in their homes 
is also an important public health goal during this 
pandemic. A civil right to counsel in eviction pro-
ceedings will help achieve this goal.
Landlords are almost always represented in court 
by attorneys while many tenants do not have 
representation.75 Many tenants would have strong 
legal defenses to prevent eviction but lack the 
knowledge and skills to prevail without assis-
tance.76 In Chicago, having an attorney decreased 
tenants’ “odds of getting an eviction order by 
about 25%.”77 In an evaluation of a legal assistance 
program for low-income tenants in New York 
City’s Housing Court, the results demonstrated 
that having legal counsel produced large differ-
ences in outcomes for the low-income tenants. 
“For example, only 22% of represented tenants 
had final judgments against them, compared with 
51% of tenants without legal representation,” the 
evaluation said.78 Harvard researchers have also 
empirically shown that Massachusetts’ outcomes 
are materially improved for tenants when they 
have access to full legal representation.79 
Currently, New York City, San Francisco, and 
Newark have right-to-counsel programs for 
tenants in eviction.80 Various pilot programs 
have demonstrated that a targeted approach for 
supporting low-income housing court litigants in 
danger of homelessness with legal, financial, and 
social service interventions can keep them from 
homelessness.81 In New York City, when Housing 
Court eviction cases were “resolved by [the Office 
of Civil Justice’s] legal services providers, 84% of 
households represented in court by lawyers were 
able to remain in their homes, not only saving 
thousands of tenancies but also promoting the 
preservation of affordable housing and neigh-
borhood stability.”82 Many reports have conclud-
ed that the monetary benefits of representing 
eligible beneficiaries in eviction and foreclosure 
proceedings far outweigh the costs of providing 
these services.83 
Thus, in an effort to further stave off homeless-
ness once the eviction and foreclosure forbear-
ance measures have expired, we recommend a 
5-year right-to-counsel program of civil legal aid 
in eviction and foreclosure cases. The right-to-
counsel program would be funded by competi-
tively granting awards to governmental entities 
to assist low-income tenants and homeowners. 
This would ensure that they obtain housing ben-
efits to which they are entitled and would assist 
them in housing courts when faced with losing 
their apartments or homes.84 The award recipi-
ents’ programs should focus on making full legal 
representation available to low-income tenants 
facing eviction in housing court or termination 
in a public housing authority proceeding, and to 
low-income homeowners facing foreclosure.85 The 
Consolidated Appropriations Act includes $20 
million in competitive grants for free legal assis-
tance to low-income tenants facing eviction, but 
this remains insufficient given the enormity of the 
problem.86 
As federal funds are unlikely to meet all needs 
related to legal representation regarding housing 
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issues, we strongly recommend that states fund 
such programs as needed. We note that up to 
10% of the emergency rental assistance provided 
under the Consolidated Appropriations Act can 
be used for “housing stability services.” While it is 
unclear what the phrase “housing stability ser-
vices” includes, the statute refers to “case man-
agement and other services related to the novel 
coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak.”87 We 
believe that states should interpret this language 
broadly to include legal services, and they should 
use this funding to support right-to-counsel 
programs.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MITIGATING 
HOUSING INSTABILITY AFTER THE 
PANDEMIC
The second priority is to develop place-based in-
terventions that mitigate housing instability in the 
years after the pandemic ends. Legislators should 
resist creating something from whole cloth. Exist-
ing place-based intervention strategies, including 
the LIHTC program and a reformed OZ program, 
can be used to quickly and efficiently support 
long-term demand for affordable housing, as 
many investors already participate in these pro-
grams. To ensure that the benefits of these inter-
ventions flow to neighborhood residents instead 
of investors, the law should prioritize affordable 
housing and development that is likely to directly 
benefit community residents.88 
During the Great Recession, a significant barrier 
to advancing these objectives was the lack of re-
sources. The LIHTC program struggled to provide 
adequate incentives during a recession period. 
Although the Consolidated Appropriations Act 
effectively increased the size of LIHTC benefits 
for certain transactions, those changes may prove 
insufficient to attract affordable housing invest-
ment during an economic downturn. During the 
Great Recession, the Tax Credit Assistance Pro-
gram and Tax Credit Exchange Program provided 
direct grants to promote affordable housing de-
velopment, helping to sustain LIHTC investment.89 
Lawmakers should consider reinstating those 
grant programs during the recovery period and 
preemptively during future housing crises.
The recently enacted OZ legislation offers an-
other pool of capital that could be tapped to 
increase the supply of affordable housing. How-
ever, for this place-based tool to help distressed 
communities, there must be an affirmative effort 
for investments to reflect the affordable housing 
needs of the residents within designated oppor-
tunity zones.90 Ideally, such tax incentives would 
incorporate procedures for screening projects 
and approval would be required by an administer-
ing agency with expertise in development within 
low-income communities.91 We propose a pro-
gram of competitively awarded grants to certified 
Community Development Financial Institutions 
(CDFIs) and qualified non-profit housing organi-
zations that partner with Qualified Opportunity 
Funds (QOFs) to develop affordable housing. 
Certified CDFIs are part of the existing landscape 
of community lenders that often provide funding 
for affordable housing developments.92 
The U.S. Treasury Department’s Community 
Development Financial Institutions Fund (CDFI 
Fund) would allocate these grants through a 
competitive application process to certified CDFIs 
or qualified nonprofits with an affordable housing 
mission that can partner with a QOF on an afford-
able housing project.93 The goal of partnering a 
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QOF with a certified CDFI Fund or qualified non-
profit is to steer the approximately $10 billion of 
QOF equity into sorely needed affordable housing 
projects in opportunity zones instead of the hotel 
and luxury apartment projects that have already 
tainted the OZ tool’s reputation. 
By providing grants directly to nonprofits that will 
perform targeted activities—such as the provision 
of affordable housing or the creation of homeless 
shelters—the government can increase the like-
lihood that expenditures will support activities 
that are most necessary during the pandemic. The 
Consolidated Appropriations Act included $1.75 
billion to assist community development financial 
institutions that invest in neighborhoods dispro-
portionately impacted by the pandemic, funding 
that could conceivably be used for this proposal.94 
To implement this incentive, the 
Internal Revenue Service, the CDFI 
Fund, and the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development would 
need to work together to coordinate 
the distribution and oversight of 
additional funds. All agencies need 
to have employees high enough on 
the administrative chain communi-
cate with each other and incentivize 
subordinates to coordinate. Further-
more, employees in each agency 
need to work together to analyze 
and manage the program and its 
outcomes.95 FortunatelyA, these 
agencies are already called upon 
to coordinate the administration of 
tax incentives for affordable hous-
ing and community development, 
such as the New Markets Tax Credit. 
By taking advantage of established 
cross-agency administrative struc-
tures, lawmakers can minimize the 
administrative burdens associated 
with the new grant.
CONCLUSION
In this Policy Spotlight, we have set forth two 
significant priorities: direct mitigation of housing 
instability during the pandemic, and place-based 
interventions to mitigate long-term housing insta-
bility and geographic inequality. 
We recommend the following approaches to miti-
gate housing instability during the pandemic:
• Reinstatement of the Homelessness Prevention 
and Rapid Re-Housing program
• Expansion of the Section 8 Housing Choice 
Voucher Program, as well as source of income 
protections for voucher-assisted renters
• Establishment at the state level of a 5-year 
right-to-counsel program of civil legal aid in 
eviction and foreclosure cases.
We recommend the following approaches to miti-
gate long-term housing instability: 
• Reinstatement of the Tax Credit Assistance 
Program and Tax Credit Exchange Program 
during the recovery period, and laws that allow 
these programs to be quickly reinstated during 
future crises
• Expansion of competitively awarded grants to 
certified Community Development Financial 
Institutions and qualified non-profit housing or-
ganizations that partner with Qualified Oppor-
tunity Funds to develop affordable housing.
After a year of tremendous sacri-
fice, struggle, and loss, the steps 
taken at all government levels have 
prevented an unprecedented and 
swift-moving housing crisis. Still, 
stable housing requires substantial 
long-term investments in households 
and housing markets facing housing 
instability. Shoring up the substan-
tial investments already made with 
ongoing direct rental and mortgage 
payment assistance, a new civil right 
to counsel in evictions, and flexible 
funds for place-based interventions 
to promote affordable housing devel-
opment will help prevent a wave of 
evictions in the coming months and 
prevent the seeding of future crises. 
As our nation faces unprecedented 
housing and financial disruptions, the 
investments we make now will help 
those bearing the greatest burden 
during the crisis. The investments 









make now will 
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